

SECRET, [REDACTED]

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28 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT : Amplification

1. The military reaction analysis papers should consider (1) the probable nature of DRV, Soviet and Chinese counter actions to our moves, (2) the effect such moves will have on DRV, Soviet and Chinese judgments of our intentions, (3) their effect on Hanoi's willingness to enter into meaningful negotiations, (4) their impact on the movement of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.

2. The analysis should also ring the changes on estimating DRV, Chinese and Russian reaction to (1) bombing of shipping and mining of Haiphong harbor, (2) a bombing involving significant increases in the scope and intensity of attacks on military, industrial and transportation targets in NVN but not involving operations near the Chinese border, not involving attacks on population centers, not involving mining of harbor, not in involving any bombing of dikes, and not involving further attacks on airfields, and (3) a program similar to (2) and involving the same number of sorties but confined to that portion of North Vietnam which lies south of the 20th parallel.

3. On the two alternate U.S. courses, the stronger means thinking of a force increase over two years on the order of 200,000 with intensified activity against North Vietnam and Laos. The weaker means thinking of present programs and not more than perhaps a division in force level augmentation.

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Orig [REDACTED]

George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

1 - DCI Audit Project

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SECRET, [REDACTED]

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OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

1. An analysis of South Vietnam's economy.
2. An analysis of North Vietnam's economy.
3. Effectiveness of our aerial operations against North Vietnam and of the enemy efforts to combat and compensate for them.

Handcarried by Mr. Carver to Mr. R.J. Smith/Mr. Morell, 27 Apr 67

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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

1. North Vietnamese (Communist) political capabilities in the non-Communist world.
2. North Vietnam: (1) Motivation and intentions, (2) GVN/allied successes Hanoi would tolerate in the south, (3) GVN/allied successes Hanoi would permit on North Vietnamese territory.
3. Effect of the bombing on North Vietnamese thinking, particularly in regard to negotiations.

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27Apr67

Audit Pro-

3. Effect of the bombing on North Vietnamese thinking, particularly in regard to negotiations.

III. By the Office of Research and Reports

1. An analysis of South Vietnam's economy.
2. An analysis of North Vietnam's economy.
3. Effectiveness of our aerial operations against North Vietnam and of the enemy efforts to combat and compensate for them.



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V. By the Vietnamese Affairs Staff

1. An analysis of the military situation in South Vietnam.
2. An analysis of pacification.
3. An analysis of political developments and prospects in South Vietnam.
4. Communist order of battle, including comments on unit effectiveness, infiltration, recruitment and losses.

I - C\EE - State of the Viet Cong infrastructure.

I - GVC C\PHONO\

Offices charged with primary responsibility for individual papers will, of course, consult with their colleagues in the other components.

I - C\AE\AND

I - D\CKK

I - D\OCI

I - DDI

I - D\ONE

I - D\PHONO

I - D\OCN

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